Closing the Timing Gap in the Anonymization Layer: A Dual-Component Timing Side-Channel Countermeasure Against IDBleed

Statut : article de revue accepté le 22 septembre 2026 dans Cybersecurity (Springer Nature). Le DOI sera ajouté à la parution. Yulliwas Ameur est l’auteur correspondant.

Résumé

Exclusive-use Internet-of-Things devices remain vulnerable to tracking even when address randomization is enabled, because trust-dependent processing behavior can still reveal a stable signal. This study shows that the Anonymization Layer leaves a timing channel unprotected: the packet-unwrapping routine follows two execution paths that differ by about 8 ms. The paper introduces a dual-component defense, Fail-Fast Suppression and Temporal Jitter. Across six ablation settings, the combined defense reduces attack accuracy to 50.4%, statistically indistinguishable from random guessing, with no measurable loss of legitimate throughput under an adversarial flood.